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Abstract: One of the major themes of Ranulph Glanville’s work has been the intimate 
connection between cybernetics and design, the two principle disciplines that he has worked 
in and contributed to. In this paper I review the significance of the analogy that he proposes 
between the two and its connection to his concerns with, firstly, the cybernetic practice of 
cybernetics and, secondly, the relation between cybernetics and ethics. I propose that by 
putting the cybernetics-design analogy together with the idea that in cybernetics 
epistemological and ethical questions coincide, we can understand design as not just a form of 
cybernetic practice but also one in which ethical questions are implicit. 
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Introduction 
One of the major themes of Ranulph Glanville’s research, and especially so in the 
period I have known him (from 2005 onwards), has been the intimate relation between 
cybernetics and design, the two principle disciplines that he has worked in and contributed to. 
The close analogy he developed between the two (Glanville, 2006a, 2006b, 2007c, 2009b), in 
terms of their conversational circularity, is notable not just for brining the two disciplines to 
bear upon each other but also for unifying these two major strands of his own research. 
In this paper I focus on this analogy and its significance. As well as noting some of 
the ways in which each discipline has the potential to inform the other, I emphasise 
connections with two of Ranulph’s other major concerns within cybernetics: (1) with 
answering Margaret Mead’s (1968) challenge that we practice cybernetics in accordance with 
its ideas; and (2) with the relation between cybernetics and ethics, on which Ranulph has 
written in this journal as well as elsewhere (Glanville, 2005, 2004/2009), and with which I 
was concerned in my PhD research as Ranulph’s student (Sweeting, 2014). 
Cybernetics and Design 
I worked as research assistant to Ranulph when he guest-edited the Cybernetics and 
Design special double issue of Kybernetes (Glanville, 2007a) which set out to build bridges 
between the two disciplines.3 In this intention, the issue followed on from many earlier 
examples of crossovers and influence. In architecture, my own field, the most notable 
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examples centre on the work of Gordon Pask, Ranulph’s mentor.4 During the 1960s and 
1970s Pask collaborated with the architect Cedric Price and theatre director Joan Littlewood 
on the Fun Palace project and with Nicholas Negroponte’s Architecture Machine Group at 
MIT, while his Musicolour installation was a key influence on John and Julia Frazer’s 
contribution to Price’s Generator project.5 Since that period the relation between the two 
fields had become obscured and, while the increasing possibilities of technology have led to a 
reawakening of interest in cybernetics amongst designers, this has often been, as Ranulph 
(2007c) notes, in rather “ancient” (p. 1177) cybernetics rather than an up to date 
understanding of the field. In organising this collection, and especially in his own 
contribution, Ranulph attempted to reconnect each field to the other, introducing 
cyberneticians to design and designers to cybernetics.6 
If one of the motivations for the journal issue as a whole was with (re-)establishing 
the potential relevance of each field to the other, in the second half of his paper Ranulph 
proposed seeing them not just as being related but as closely paralleling each other, to the 
extent that “cybernetics is the theory of design and design is the action of cybernetics”  
(2007c, p. 1178). This claim rests on a close analogy between the sort of conversational 
circularity with which cybernetics is concerned, as explored especially in Pask’s (1976) 
conversation theory, and the distinctive way in which designers work, as is particularly 
evident in characteristic methods such as sketching as well as more generally in modelling 
and drawing. Indeed, the way designers work is often understood as a conversation that they 
hold with themselves and others, such as, for instance, in the account given by Donald Schön 
(1983/1991), who characterises design as a “reflective conversation with the situation” (p. 
76).7 
The activities of conversation and sketching both share a circular form. In sketching, 
this circularity is created by our shifting perspective between looking and drawing in a way 
that parallels the turning around between listening and speaking in a conversation.8 This 
enables evaluations of previous actions to influence present ones in a classic example of 
cybernetic feedback. The significance of this structure, however, goes beyond a cycle of 
iterations in pursuit of some goal. Just as a conversation, because of its interactive structure, 
tends to lead somewhere we could not have predicted in advance, so too the conversational 
interactivity of designers’ drawing and modelling is one way in which they create novelty9 
and is what allows them to work in the complex situations which they commonly encounter.10 
This tendency towards the new in a conversation follows from the way that meanings 
are not transferred between participants but, rather, participants construct their own 
understanding of the understanding of others, with the process taking the recursive form of 
“what I think of what you think I think, etc.” (Glanville, 1993, p. 217). For instance, if, in a 
simple two person conversation, I begin by presenting some idea, the other participant does 
not simply have this transferred to them but builds their own understanding of what it is that I 
mean. They then present what they have understood back to me and, again, I construct my 
own understanding of their presentation. I can then compare this understanding (what I 
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understand of what they understood) to what I originally meant to communicate (see the 
diagram given in Glanville, 2009b, p. 432).  
While we can repeat this process in an attempt to align these separately constructed 
understandings, it is not just (and often not even11) a way to reach agreement about existing 
ideas but, and more significantly in terms of the parallel with design, a way to generate new 
ones. Given that the difference between what participants understand is maintained 
throughout, we construct new understandings at every turn. We learn from the ideas that 
others present to us and from their comments on and criticisms of our own thoughts. We also 
often learn through misunderstanding, where we see a worthwhile idea in what someone says 
that was not intended. Perhaps most simply, we learn what is implied by our own ideas by 
seeing how they are interpreted and understood by others. This also occurs in conversations 
we hold with ourselves, as for instance in sketching.12 When sketching, the designer 
simultaneously plays the roles of speaker (drawing) and listener (looking), switching roles 
between the two. Looking at what they have drawn they see some new possibility not 
previously intended and which can be developed further (Glanville, 2007c, p. 1189). In this 
sense designers’ drawing is an integral part of their thinking, not a representation of ideas 
constructed previously. 
While in one sense the feedback process of sketching allows designers to pursue 
some idea, as with conversation, this idea is not fixed at the outset but is developed through 
the process.13 As Denys Lasdun (1965) put it, in remarks which are often quoted (not least by 
Ranulph), the architect’s “job is to give the client, on time and on cost, not what he wants, but 
what he never dreamed he wanted and when he gets it, he recognizes it as something he 
wanted all the time” (p. 185). While this is sometimes read as a paternalistic claim to genius 
or expertise, it is better thought of as indicating the way that, in trying to achieve some idea, 
we revise not just the attempt to fulfill it but also the idea itself, having learnt more about it 
and the situation just as a conversation changes course through our participation in it.14 
Indeed, Lasdun’s remark can be extended to apply as much to designers as to their clients, 
with new possibilities created as part of the process which designers could not have 
anticipated in advance. 
From cybernetics to design and design to cybernetics 
The point that Ranulph makes with this analogy concerns what is special and 
distinctive about design. As such, bringing cybernetics and design together is not about 
changing what designers do but, rather, about recognising the value in what is already being 
done and supporting it. In this it is different to many of the encounters that design has had 
with theory, where the task of theory is taken as correcting or reforming design in new ways. 
This is especially the case with architecture, which has a tendency to import theories external 
to itself in an attempt at reinvention or justification, often with the consequence of distorting 
the questions at hand.15 In contrast, rather than cybernetic theory being something to be 
applied to design, the analogy with conversation positions cybernetics and design as 
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coinciding with each other, a point that is reinforced by the designerly nature of much 
cybernetic research, such as that of Pask, where ideas are explored performatively through the 
construction of experimental devices (a quality which has been emphasised by Pickering, 
2010). This reinforces design’s disciplinary foundations, articulating its implicit epistemology 
(Glanville, 2006a, 2006b) and helping us see the sometimes contested relation between design 
and research in designerly terms (Glanville, 1981, 1999). 
The nature of this analogy means that, as well as bringing cybernetics to bear on 
design, design can also contribute to cybernetics, thus informing theory from practice as well 
as practice from theory (Glanville, 2014). While there are many ways in which ideas from 
design practice are relevant to cybernetic questions, perhaps the most significant of these is in 
answering the challenge Mead (1968) set the American Society for Cybernetics (ASC) at its 
inaugural conference, that of applying cybernetic ideas to cybernetic practice. This was of 
increasing importance to Ranulph in recent years, in his role as president of the ASC, where 
he proposed alternative conversational conference formats as well as running a competition in 
response to Mead’s question, won by Mick Ashby (Glanville, 2011b; 2012, pp. 197-210). 
While the most obvious legacy of Mead’s challenge was the epistemological concerns of 
second-order cybernetics, as developed by Heinz von Foerster and others, in Ranulph’s 
interpretation this question was more about the value of cybernetic performance, similar to 
that he sees in the way designers work. If we understand cybernetics and design as the theory 
and practice of each other, then the cybernetic practice of cybernetics must look very like 
design, as indeed do many of the examples that Pickering (2010) discusses. The significance 
of this parallel is heightened by the way that design is at home in often complex, ill-defined 
and ethically charged circumstances, demonstrating how we can act cybernetically in 
situations where such a suggestion might otherwise seem overly optimistic. 
Cybernetics, Design and Ethics 
Towards the end of his contribution to the special issue, Ranulph connects his 
cybernetics-design analogy to his earlier reflections on the relationship between cybernetics 
and ethics (2007c, p. 1197-1198). In his (2004/2009) article “Desirable Ethics”, Ranulph 
argues that the central mechanisms of cybernetics—such as the black box (another 
longstanding concern of Ranulph's cybernetics; see  Glanville, 1982, 2007/2009, 2009a) and 
conversation amongst others—depend on qualities that are commonly taken to be ethically 
desirable: generosity, honesty, learning, mutuality, open-mindedness, respect, responsibility, 
selflessness, sharing and trusting. The structure of this argument reflects that of von Foerster 
(1974/2003), who understood ethical considerations as coinciding with cybernetics. This is 
what underlies Ranulph’s deep concern with both Mead’s challenge and design practice: to 
act cybernetically, as Mead proposes and as designers do, is to act out these ethical qualities. 
Ranulph’s careful framing of this argument is worth noting. He avoids going beyond 
a descriptive account of ethics, referring to values that are seen as desirable rather than to 
what “is” ethical. In so doing he avoids the way that, as von Foerster (1992, p. 12) points out, 
speaking explicitly about ethics can lead to moralisation. What von Foerster proposes in 
response to this is that we keep ethical considerations implicit in our acting, avoiding 
articulating them explicitly. In particular he emphasises two points, both of which build on 
the inclusion of the observer in second-order cybernetics: taking complete personal 
responsibility and participating in dialogue with others (pp. 13-18). While von Foerster’s 
account associates dialogue directly with language, we can also understand it in terms of 
design, as per Ranulph’s analogy between design and conversation. In this way, putting the 
relationships between cybernetics and design and cybernetics and ethics together, it is 
possible to see design via cybernetics as an activity in which ethical considerations are 
implicit and, therefore, as a way of responding to the challenges which von Foerster raises 
(see Sweeting, 2014). 
Conversation is, in words which von Foerster (1991) credited to Victor Frankl, a 
thinking “through the eyes of the other”. Similarly, design, because of its conversational 
structure, involves the consideration of others.16 While this is partly in its explicit attempts at 
participation, such as consultation with stakeholders etc., it is also, implicitly, in the 
conversations that designers hold with themselves. When drawing, architects “walk through” 
their plans in order to imagine how what they have drawn would be experienced, putting 
themselves in the place of absent others, many of whom (passers-by, future users) they will 
not be able to meet (Kenniff & Sweeting, 2014; Sweeting, 2014, pp. 106-110). Whereas 
ethical considerations are often thought of as external to or even as in conflict with design, 
this consideration of others is indispensible to what designers do. This is not to say that the 
way designers act is necessarily “ethically good” but that it is, at least potentially, ethical in 
the sense of involving ethical considerations within it (that is, in the sense that an ethical 
question is a question concerned with ethics rather than an “ethically good” question). In this 
way, design provides us with an example not just of cybernetic practice but also of a way of 
acting, applicable in complex circumstances, where ethical considerations are implicit. 
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